Fantasy Author Ron Glick Interview

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Urgent Issue

Anyone following this blog will note that I have not been posting much lately. the reason for this is that my posts here tend to provoke retaliations, so I have been withholding my freedom of expression so that I can maintain some semblance of liberty to continue to pursue my legal rights. It is bad enough that I am confined to my room due to the machinations of my probation officer (and of course, he blames me), but i also have to keep relatively silent about the autrocities committed against me. Clearly, that no longer matters...
Today, Dave Edwards with the Montana Department of Probation and Parole has once again threatened me with being returned to prison,thsi time in retaliation for confronting him over perjury he committed in an affidavit filed with the Montana Supreme Court in response to my habeas petition. Just thought you all should know that if I suddenly stop responding to emails, this is why: I have been once again incarcerated for pursuing my civil rights...

Latest Filings

    I have been a bit remiss in updating this, but here goes:
    Two days ago, I received a very expedited order on the Findings and Recommendations of Magistrate Judge Jeremiah Lynch, an order signed by Judge Donald Molloy of the United States District Court, Montana District. This is probably the fastest I have ever received a review of findings and recommendations from this court (in all, a five day turn-around) in the four-plus years I have had dealings with them - typically I am forced to wait months for Judge Molloy to review Findings and Recommendations. Clearly I ruffled some feathers by filing objection to Judge Lynch's authority to issue orders.
    With little surprise, Judge Molloy adopted Judge Lynch's Findings and Recommendations in full, and issued a separate order granting me until April 1, 2010, to file a second amended complaint that effectively required me to dismiss all but one defendant, and grossly restricting the claim I could raise against the remaining one. I immediately filed two additional motions to this: A Motion To Identify Does One and Two in the complaint as Judge's Lynch and Molloy, and a Motion For Reconsideration and Extension of Time, which additionally called for striking the Findings and Recommendations. I will present the text of these motions following this narration.
     Once again, I was amazed at an amazingly prompt response from Judge Molloy, this time with only a two day turn-around. In a move that is clearly a conflict of interest, Molloy personally denied the Motion to name himself and Judge Lynch as defendants and denied the motion for reconsideration and extension of time. As consequence of the foregoing, since it is clear that I cannot possibly receive any kind of impartial ruling from the US District Court of Montana, I am filing Notice of Appeal today (again, I will include the text thereof hereafter).
     Last time I sought to appeal Judge Molloy's order, he actually filed an order instructing the court clerk to not file the appeal, so I expect there will be some kind of similar action taken here. I will be filing a duplicate of the Notice with the Court of Appeals, but I expect this will all require a review by the US Supreme Court, which of course has no obligation to even hear any of this.
     Folks, I am running out of ideas here - any suggestions or assistance would be appreciated.
     As promised, here is the text to the three filings (Note, I realize in hindsight that I misdated the first two motions, but as they are already filed with the Court, I cannot edit them now):

---

Ron Glick
24 1st Avenue West #105B
Kalispell, MT 59901
(406) 257-0479 / 871-3893 (cell)
ron_glick@yahoo.com

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
MISSOULA DIVISION
_______

Ron Glick, ) Cause No. CV 09-128-M
)
Plaintiff, ) Motion to Identify Does 1 and 2 )
)
v. )
)
Eleventh Judicial District Court of )
Montana, et al, )
)
Defendants. )
_____________________________ )

     Comes now Plaintiff Ron Glick, proceeding pro se herein, to identify to the Court the identities of Defendants Doe 1 and Doe 2 in the above-entitled cause, and to wit:
     Plaintiff has been proceeding with causes of action in this Court against State of Montana government entities and representatives since in or around July, 2006, such actions primarily pursuant to 18 USC Section 1961 and 1983 and numerous United States Constitutional authorities. In such times, Judges Jeremiah Lynch and Donald Molly have acted in consistent pattern to both quash the claims Plaintiff has presented, acting contrary to law, and to bar Plaintiff from appellate review through assertion that Plaintiff's appeal would have no merit. In Plaintiff's most recent action, Judges Lynch and Molloy have acted together to once again quash claims pending against the majority of defendants in the above-entitled cause, and in doing so have acted contrary to law by ignoring the implications of RICO law and asserting that Plaintiff's claims are implausible based solely upon a prejudicial opinion that State actors could not conceivably be acting in the capacity alleged by Plaintiff. Such actions have placed said judges in a position of defending and validating an illicit conspiracy and racketeering organization operating in Montana. As such, said judges' actions have made them a party to this action pursuant to the RICO Act (18 USC Section 1961), in that their actions are supporting the racketeering activities directed against Plaintiff.
     In performing a review or analysis of facts, a judge may not assess the plausibility of the facts themselves. The Court must accept well-pleaded facts as true, even if “actual proof of those facts is improbable”. (Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 Sct 1937, 1949-50 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Trombly, 550 US 544, 577 (2007)). In Judge Molloy's own Order of March 26, 2009, his own conclusion that Plaintiff's claims “simply exceed the limits of plausibility” is in clear violation of this legal foundation, and, in so blatantly ignoring it, he has demonstrated that the decisions of this Court are not in defense of the law in so much as the perpetuation of a separate agenda that, regardless its actual motivation, are nevertheless acts taken in conjunction with the actions directed against Plaintiff by the other defendants alleged within Plaintiff's causes of action.
     As consequence of the foregoing, Plaintiff is left with little alternative than to move of the Court to identify Defendant Doe 1 as Judge Jeremiah Lynch and Defendant Doe 2 as Judge Donald Molly, and that each said Defendant be sued herein in their official capacities.

     Plaintiff does hereby attest, under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of his ability to present and that this is respectfully submitted on the 24th day of March, 2010.

___________________________________
Ron Glick, Plaintiff


---

Ron Glick
24 1st Avenue West #105B
Kalispell, MT 59901
(406) 257-0479 / 871-3893 (cell)
ron_glick@yahoo.com

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
MISSOULA DIVISION
_______

Ron Glick, ) Cause No. CV 09-128-M
)
Plaintiff, ) Motion for Reconsideration and Extension of Time )
)
v. )
)
Eleventh Judicial District Court of )
Montana, et al, )
)
Defendants. )
_____________________________ )

     Comes now Plaintiff Ron Glick, proceeding pro se herein, to move of the Court to reconsider the Order of Judge Donald Molloy entered on March 26, 2010, and to wit:
     Plaintiff has sought to identify both Judges Jeremiah Lynch and Donald Molloy as Defendants in the above-entitled action. Consequently, Plaintiff believes that the order entered by Judge Donald Molloy, which represents the culminating action of said Judge in his own duplicity to support an illicit RICO organization operating within the State of Montana, should be reviewed by separate judicial authority for its legality prior to the filing of appeal by Plaintiff.
     Further, since Plaintiff cannot realistically file an amended complaint pending review of this motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff respectfully requests an extension of time to file any amended complaint pending the review of this motion.
     WHEREFORE, Plaintiff does respectfully request of the Court to reconsider the Order entered on or about March 26, 2010, to strike the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge in this cause, to order a new review of the merits of this cause by a separate judicial authority other than one answerable to Judge Donald Molloy, and to grant an extension of time sufficient to permit for the Court to review the merits of this motion.
     Plaintiff does hereby attest, under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of his ability to present and that this is respectfully submitted on the 24th day of March, 2010.

___________________________________
Ron Glick, Plaintiff

---

Ron Glick
24 1st Avenue West #105B
Kalispell, MT 59901
(406) 257-0479 / 871-3893 (cell)
ron_glick@yahoo.com

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
MISSOULA DIVISION
_______

Ron Glick, ) Cause No.
)
Plaintiff, ) Notice of Appeal )
)
v. )
)
Eleventh Judicial District Court of )
Montana, et al, )
)
Defendants. )
_____________________________ )

     Notice is hereby given that Ron Glick, Plaintiff in the above-entitled cause, heraby appeals to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals from the order entered in this action on or about March 26, 2010, in that said order is contrary to law, exhibits conclusions of the Court based upon prejudice and bias rather than the factual assertions of Plaintiff, and that this Court has abused its judicial capacity to thwart any actions brought against the State of Montana or any governmental entity or representative within the State, and that it has acted in conflict of interests to shelter itself from prosecution.

    Respectfully submitted on the 31st day of March, 2010.

___________________________________
Ron Glick, Plaintiff

cc: Ninth Judicial Court of Appeals

Latest Filing

     My last post cited the content of objections filed to the Findings and Recommendations of US District Court Magistrate Judge Lynch. Prior to filing the objections, I had filed for an extension of time to file the objections (requesting the weekend only) and an extension of time upon the order of Judge Lynch to file a second amended complaint pending the de novo review of the objections, a filing that would have essentially forced me to voluntarily dismiss the majority of my claims against the corrupt individuals in Kalispell and Helena, Montana. On March 15, 2010, Judge Lynch granted the extension of time for the filing of the objections, denied the extension of time for filing of a second amended complaint, and ordered a second amended complaint filed by March 25, 2010.
     Essentially, what the US Magistrate Judge is doing is acting to quash the claims against the rogue authorities in Montana. And previous experience has told me that Judge Donald Molloy, the actual appointed US District Court Judge, is the one setting the agenda in this area. The US District Court of Western Montana has been acting to quash my claims against the corrupt officials in Montana now for four years. Whether this agenda is based off of the Republican mindset of corporate run government or some personal defense of the state-wide Good Ol' Boy system, I cannot say. However, the end result is the same: there is not justice in any court located geographically within the state of Montana, even those supposedly separated from state government. Incidentally, I have once before attempted to file a complaint against Judge Molloy with the US District Court of Appeals in California for legislating from the bench and depriving indigent persons right of access to the courts indiscriminately, only to have even the Court of Appeals defend him.
     A US District Court Magistrate has no lawful authority to issue orders or quash claims (pursuant to 28 USC Section 636); He can only provide findings and recommendations for review by the actual District Court Judge, in this case, Donald Molloy. Since I cannot realistically be expected to dismiss my claims prior to the lawfully entitled de novo review of my objections, especially not upon an unlawful order, I have filed the following objection with the court to the unlawful order issued by Judge Lynch:

Ron Glick
24 1st Avenue West #105B
Kalispell, MT 59901
(406) 257-0479 / 871-3893 (cell)
ron_glick@yahoo.com

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
MISSOULA DIVISION
_______

Ron Glick, ) Cause No.
)
Plaintiff, ) Objections To The Court's Order of ) of March 15, 2010
)
v. )
)
Eleventh Judicial District Court of )
Montana, et al, )
)
Defendants. )
_____________________________ )

     Comes now Plaintiff, pro se herein, to object to the United States Magistrates March 15, 2010, Order, and to wit:
     The Court has issued an order contrary to law, and Plaintiff hereby objects to the enforcement thereof. Pursuant to 28 USC Section 636(b)(1)(A), a magistrate judge has authority “to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or information made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an action.” Pursuant to 28 USC Section 636(b)(1)(C), a magistrate judge is required to submit his recommendations to the Court. At no point may a magistrate judge issue an order quashing a claim or action. In fact, the only authority a magistrate has in issuance of orders is concerning the release or detention of persons pending trial (28 USC Section 636(a)(2)).
     As consequence of the foregoing, the magistrate judge's order compelling Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint on or before March 25, 2010, and in doing so dismiss the majority of his claims pending review by the court through his timely filed objections, is clearly contrary to law, and Plaintiff is entitled to a full review by the court prior to enforcement of any such order issued by the magistrate judge in this cause.
     WHEREFORE, Plaintiff does hereby object to the order issued by the magistrate in this cause and respectfully requests of the court to conduct a de novo review, as required by 28 USC Section 636(b)(1), of Plaintiff's objections prior to enforcing any order compelling Plaintiff to file any further amended complaints, and to provide Plaintiff his constitutional right to appeal pending disagreement with said review.

     Plaintiff above named does hereby attest under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of his ability to present and that this is respectfully submitted on the 24th day of March, 2010.

___________________________________
Ron Glick, Plaintiff

New Filing

     Recently, I received a Findings and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge in response to the RICO action I filed (previously posted to this blog). No surprise, really, but that Court is trying to avoid taking on this issue, mostly through misrepresenting the facts presented and trying to avoid considering their authority and responsibility pursuant to RICO. It has been my long experience that the federal courts turn a blind eye to Montana's improprieties, but this is a new low even for them.
     Irregardless, as has been my pattern of late, I am posting the content of my Objections to this blog for public scrutiny. I believe you can fairly assess the basic direction of the Findings and Recommendation by the content of my response, but by all means, feel free to review the original. Afterall, US District Court documents are public record.
     Here then is my Objection:

---

Ron Glick
24 1st Avenue West #105B
Kalispell, MT 59901
(406) 257-0479 / 871-3893 (cell)
ron_glick@yahoo.com

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
MISSOULA DIVISION
_______

Ron Glick, ) Cause No.
)
Plaintiff, ) Objections To The Court's Findings And ) Recommendations Of United States Magistrate
) Judge
v. )
)
Eleventh Judicial District Court of )
Montana, et al, )
)
Defendants. )
_____________________________ )

     Comes now Plaintiff, pro se herein, to object to the United States Magistrates Findings and Recommendations, and to wit:
     The Court has made determinations based upon presumptions and conclusions that are not supported by Plaintiff's pleadings. In fact, much of what the Court relies upon seems to be an independent perception of how due process should work, yet ignores the actual reported facts within the content of Plaintiff's complaint and addendum. Additionally, though the Court has in multiple instances within this cause made reference to Plaintiff's pleadings being too extensive and lacking evidence, in the past when Plaintiff has filed overly brief accounts or supported his attestments with documentation, the Court has found fault in claims not having substance and not needing to be supported by evidence at the initial pleading stage. In essence, it seems that no matter what method Plaintiff seeks to deliver his claims to this Court, it is simply impossible to meet the criteria of the Court because it changes each and every time Plaintiff makes a filing. It seems clear from Plaintiff's extensive history with this Court therefore that no claim filed by Plaintiff will ever be given fair consideration upon the merits of his claim, regardless of whether Plaintiff makes brief or extended attestments, provides or does not provide evidence of the wrongs committed or simply makes filings or does not.
     In any instance, this Court has demonstrated a blatant prejudice towards Plaintiff and his claims, and as such, though Plaintiff is making the filing of his objections in this cause, it is with the full expectation that his arguments will be ignored and that the necessity of filing an appeal will be required to proceed. Still further, Plaintiff is fully aware that the Court will yet again attempt to block this appeal by declaring that any appeal will not have merit or simply instructing the clerk not to file the notice of appeal, yet Plaintiff still intends to contest these issues. Just as the State of Montana, in its various forms, seeks to ignore the issues raised by Plaintiff, and thereby to validate the violations of Plaintiff's civil rights, so does this Court seem intent upon preserving a corrupt power structure within the State of Montana by ignoring its powers and duties under the United States Constitution. Plaintiff cannot begin to speculate the reason for this blatant disregard of integrity of the Court, but as he has been filing with this Court now for over four years and has met the same biases and prejudices repeatedly while under this Court's jurisdiction, it cannot be ignored that such biases and prejudices exist.
     As such, Plaintiff does make these objections, knowing full well that his efforts to seek justice will be ignored and directly obstructed by this Court yet again, but does make notice that the content hereof will be publicly posted on the Internet so that the actions of this Court will be held to public scrutiny.
    I. The Court's Summary
     The Court summarizes the actions of government Defendants against Plaintiff, yet does so in such a way as to omit the actual offending elements of said Defendants' misdeeds. Though the actual elements of the criminal cause are not for the Court to address from a legal stance, the elements presented by Plaintiff are critical in the establishment of his RICO claim. For instance, the Court completely bypasses the components of Constitutional infringement by referencing years and omitting the actual span of time involved, ignoring the constitutional issue of speedy trial, and fails to discuss whatsoever other underlying elements.
     In actuality, Plaintiff was initially investigated in or around July, 2003, did not have prosecution nor arrest manifest until in or around February, 2004, and did not see trial until in or around July, 2005. In context, this represents a total period of two years between time of initial allegation and actual trial. Further, the actual delay between original allegation and actual charging, the result of said Defendants' actually dismissing the allegation entirely and only raising it again following Plaintiff taking legal action against said Defendants, is known in the courts as presumption of prejudice, since such an extended period had elapsed without prosecution following the original report, approximately 8 months (See State v Wombalt, 753 P2d 330 (1988)). By glossing over the actual dates and elapsed time, the Court apparently seeks to disregard one of the most fundamental elements of Plaintiff's claim: that Defendants have abused the legal system as it exists in Flathead County to pursue a vendetta against Plaintiff that defied all pretense of due process or jurisprudence.
     Still further, the Court disregards the impact of specific Defendants upon present and future actions, in specific Defendants Curtis and Lympus, in that they both retain control and influence over significant issues, including the continued presidence over any further actions with Plaintiff's and Defendant [*]'s criminal causes of action, as well as within the local court system that exceed their lawful capacities as judges in the normally comprehended context. Defendant Curtis retains jurisdiction over any present or future actions regarding Plaintiff's criminal cause, including current actions of Defendant Edwards' successful efforts to expand the restrictions of Plaintiff's probation to essentially bars him from all public places, and since Defendant [*]'s charge was dismissed without prejudice, Defendants are fully capable of refiling their charges against her and placing her yet again under the jurisdiction of Defendant Lympus. Still further, Defendant Curtis was the assigned judge for the appeal upon the restraining order of Defendant [*]'s, and said Defendant has neglected to act upon the cause before her now for over six months, and has instead acted to expound upon the actual criminal sentence to replace the authority of the restraining order.
     Should said Defendants retain jurisdiction over the criminal causes set forth herein, they continue to hold prejudicial influence over the welfare of Plaintiff and consequently their import in this proceeding is greatly minimized by the Court's summarization of their relevance.
     Still further, the Court has taken the context of the property suit into a separate capacity than it was intended in Plaintiff's filings. Though actions have been taken by certain Defendants in this cause towards the RICO action, specifically Defendants Allison, Stadler and Paskell, and others have acted to obstruct Plaintiff's access to his property in the furtherance of the RICO cause of action, the actual property claim is not at issue before this Court, save as an effort to remove the cause to this Court.
     Notably, the Court minimizes yet again the conduct of Defendants by, in summarizing Plaintiff's assertions, by highlighting specific language used by Plaintiff in such a way as to undermine the integrity of Plaintiff's claim. In fact, Plaintiff has actual records that support his “allegedly 'tampered'” claims, yet did not include such in his filing since the Court has previously instructed him not to include exhibit testimony. Again, this demonstrates a prejudice of the Court's towards defending the actions of Defendants based upon the belief of how a judicial system operates rather than actual understanding of the criminal misconduct of Defendants. Just because this Court could not conceive of such chicanery being committed by judicial officers should not exclude the Court's consideration that such is in fact occurring.
    II. Plaintiff's Pending Actions
     The Court has taken the position that assuming jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state causes based upon the presumption that Plaintiff retains state remedies. This is simply not true. Plaintiff has demonstrated a clear and credible effort to exhaust all state remedies, including filing for writs of supervisory control over Flathead County judicial Defendants, filing complaints with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and Judicial Ethics Committee, and attempting communication with Defendants to resolve these issues Plaintiff has sought to have issues reviewed through appeal and writ, and each instance has been met with a complete and total disregard of the issues, similar to how this Court is treating these claims. There simply are no remaining legal actions Plaintiff can take to secure his right to proceed in fair and impartial capacities within the state. As such, Plaintiff is seeking removal of all state causes overseen by Defendants from the State courts to this court, though in alternative, Plaintiff would be equally content on having the causes removed to another jurisdiction within the state, as he has requested of the Montana State Supreme Court. Utilizing the Court's own foundation, there remains no adequate opportunity in state proceedings to raise any issue, federal or otherwise. Lacking any credible recourse, Plaintiff has now turned to this Court as the last conceivable action to take without forever losing his claims and civil rights altogether.
     In essence, the state has had innumerable opportunities to resolve the pending federal issues, mosts specifically, the deprivation of due process required to proceed in a civil claim and the abuse of the criminal procedures to pursue private vendettas against an individual. In other countries, the persecution of political activists is frowned upon by America as a whole, yet when an American is subjected to a perversion of the judicial system to further the corruption of state, county or city officials, this Court's position seems to be that that is acceptable, as it preserves the independence of the state. In this perception, this Court ignores everything that has occurred over the last six years. The state courts have had abundant opportunity to address these issues, but refuse to each and every time they are raised in state courts. This Court does not have the luxury of ignoring the federal issues under the authorities it has cited, since the state court either ignores them the federal issues when raised or simply disregards them when they are convenient.
     In absence of any realistic expectation that the state will actually address federal issues, this Court is not prohibited from intervening to resolve them.
    III. Judicial Immunity
     The Court has reached the conclusion that Defendants Lympus, Curtis, Stadler and Ulbricht have judicial immunity from prosecution. This standard is applicable in all instances where a judge is acting within the clear legal context of his office, but when a judge acts outside that capacity, he becomes liable. It is well established that a judge enjoys absolute immunity against monetary damages for acts performed in his or her judicial capacity except when the judge acts “in clear absence of all jurisdiction” (Stump v. Sparkman, 435 US 349, 356-57 (1978); Mireless v. Waco, 502 US 9 (1991)). Further, qualified immunity, rather than absolute judicial immunity, applies to administrative actions by judges (Forrester v. White, 484 US 219 (1988)).
     The Court primarily attempts to defend the immunities of the judicial Defendants through authority pursuant to 42 USC Section 1983. However, jurisdiction to proceed against state actors is not restricted to Section 1983, and Plaintiff has brought this cause of action additionally and equally pursuant to the RICO Act (18 USC 1961, et seq). Pursuant to this authority, offices of public can be RICO enterprises (United States v. McDade, 827 Fsupp 1153, 1181 (E.D. Pa., 1993)), a government entity may constitute an enterprise within the meaning of RICO (United States v. Freeman, 6 F3d 586 (9th Cir, 1993)), and a RICO action may include courts (United States v. Angelilli, 660 F2d 23 (2nd Cir, 1981); United States v. Bachelor, 611 F2d 443 (3rd Cir, 1979)). Further, judges can be convicted of criminal charges of conspiracy based solely on conspiracy with their employees (See United States v. Hartley, 678 F2d 961, 972 (11th Cir, 1982) and RICO actions may be initiated against judges (See United States v. Shenberg, 89 F3d 1461 (11th Cir, 1996); United States v. Castro, 89 F3d 1443 (11th Cir, 1996). As such, Defendants are not immune from prosecution pursuant to authority under RICO.
     Judges are not above the law (United States v. Isaacs, 493 F2d 1124, 1143 (7th Cir, 1974)). Judges must not be lawless and must follow the substantive law they are intended to administer (Hurlich, Regulations of Judicial Misconduct, 2 Law and History Review 79, 80 (1984)). “No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are bound to obey it” (Samuel F. Miller, cited in Davis v. Passman, 99 Sct 2264, 2277 (1979); Butz v. Economou, 98 Sct 2894, 2910 (1978)).
     Obstructing justice is defined as “[i]mpending or obstructing those who seek justice in a court, or those who have duties or powers of administering justice therein” (Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, page 1077). Under that definition, anytime a court official or judge denies an American citizen a constitutional or statutory right, justice has been obstructed by those who are supposed to administer it. A district court cannot decline to entertain an action as a matter of whim or personal disinclination (Public Affairs Associates v. Rickover, 82 Sct 580, 581-582 (1962)), as has Defendant Curtis in the refusal to rule upon appellate review of Defendant [*]'s restraining order, due process cannot be satisfied at a hearing wherein the judge has already predetermined the outcome (United States v. Cross, 128 F3d 144, n. 2 (3rd Cir, 1997)), as is the case with Defendant Ulbricht's prejudicial predisposition, and procedural due process is violated when issues are not heard before an impartial tribunal (See Tunkovich b. Kansas Bd. Of Regents, 159 F3d 504, 518 (10th Cir, 1988)), as is the case with each of the judicial Defendants wherein they have demonstrated a clear preexisting prejudice in matters concerning Plaintiff.
     Though Plaintiff's actual complaint contains innumerable other examples of judicial impropriety, these examples set forth herein more than justify inclusion of the judicial Defendants within this cause of action. Plaintiff's complaint asserts that Defendant Stadler has collaborated with Defendant Allison to falsify and misdirect judicial proceedings; that Defendant Lympus has collaborated with other state officials to gain undue influence over witnesses (L.P. and T.P., Defendant [*]'s daughters) and has issued directives against Defendant [*] that intimidated her to withhold support and property from Plaintiff under fear of incarceration and false conviction; that Defendant Curtis continues to exert control over Plaintiff through control of Plaintiff's criminal cause, as exhibited by her continued jurisdiction over Plaintiff's upcoming post conviction relief proceedings; and that Defendant Ulbricht has acted contrary to all pretense of law in holding a hearing in which she barred Plaintiff from any pretense of due process.
     Additionally, Defendant Curtis has demonstrated even more recent actions in issuance of an order adopting Defendant Edwards' efforts to impose far stricter probationary conditions upon Plaintiff, he which in effect confine Plaintiff since in or around February, 2010, to a 6' by 10' room for fear of otherwise being returned to prison, and further modifying Plaintiff's sentencing order to adopt the conditions of the restraining order issued by Defendant Ulbricht, all of which occurred in absence of any actual probation violation or disciplinary action.
     Yet further, both federal and state immunity is overcome by the ultra vires doctrine (Painter v. Shahala, 97 F3d 1351, 1358 (10th Cir, 1996)), which is to say that immunity is not permitted in instances where the individual vested with authority acts beyond the authority of their office. Plaintiff's most fundamental claims rest upon the allegations that the judicial Defendants have acted outside the authority granted to them by the state and federal constitution. As such, the judicial Defendants are not immune from prosecution unless they can prove their conduct was permissible under constitutional and state law.
     Clearly, the judicial Defendants are acting parties of the racketeering enterprise in question, have contributed to the pattern of racketeering, and as such are acting participants of a felonious criminal conspiracy. As such, said Defendants are not immune from prosecution pursuant to RICO. Consequently, Plaintiff objects to their dismissal.
    IV. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
     The Court has determined that governmental entities are immune from prosecution pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. Again, the Court relies solely upon the authority of prosecution pursuant to 42 USC Section 1983, and completely disregards authority under RICO. As cited previously, offices of public officials can be RICO enterprises (McDade) and government entities may constitute an “enterprise” within the meaning of RICO (Freeman). Consequently, the immunity granted by the Eleventh Amendment does not exclude said Defendants from prosecution under RICO, and Plaintiff objects to their dismissal.
    V. Defendant Dave Edwards
     The Court has made a determination based solely off of 42 USC Section 1983 that restricts action against Defendant Edwards to actions as a state official. However, as stated ad nauseam heretofore, this action is precipitated under more than just Section 1983, but also pursuant to authority of RICO. As such, Defendant Edwards' conduct is not solely restricted to acting pursuant to some “established state procedure”, but instead pursuant to any action taken in furthering the pattern of racketeering activity.
     Irregardless of the foregoing, the Court's reasoning is flawed in regards even to Section 1983's restrictions. Plaintiff has cited specific actions of deprivation and harassment, not predeprivations. Though certainly the past conduct is indicative of future conduct, the predeprivation argument is irrelevant in that Defendant Edwards has already established a predisposition to committing such actions in the first place. Further, any action of an officer acting under color of state law, which Defendant Edwards has done in each instance in his position as probation officer, is actionable under Section 1983, and as such the Court's effort to minimize said Defendant's liability is impractical and without merit.
     Consequently, Plaintiff objects to the restrictions recommended by the Court in proceeding in filing a second amended complaint against Defendant Edwards.
    VI. Defendant Peg Allison
     The Court has determined that a cause of action against Defendant Allison is barred by “backwards-looking” claim restriction or by procedures still available within the presently pending property civil suit. Both positions are based upon truncated and incomplete information, and as such, conclusions based upon such faulty information has no foundation.
     Yet again, the Court ignores the implications of RICO. A RICO action requires that a pattern of racketeering activity occur, and that establishment of a pattern of racketeering activity requires showing of at least two predicate acts committed within a ten year period (See, e.g., H.J. Inc, v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 US 229, 237, 109 Sct 2893 (1989); Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F2d 698, 713, cert. Denied, 483 US 1021 (1987)). Plaintiff's complaint and addendum provide well over the two minimum predicate acts required pursuant to RICO, but taking Defendant Allison's actions alone in the broadest context possible, said Defendant has been involved in the obstruction of two separate causes of action precipitated by Plaintiff, and such actions are more than sufficient to establish claim pursuant to RICO.
     Specifically, Defendant Allison has refused to issue default judgment and summonses, has actually removed documentation from the court docket, and has conspired with at least two other Defendants to obstruct Plaintiff's right of access to the Court. Concealing documents alone is a violation of the obstruction of justice statute (United States v. Laurins, 857 F2d 529, 537 (9th Cir, 1988)). A clerk of court lacks the authority to refuse or strike a pleading presented for filing (McClellan v. Lone Star Gas Co., 66 F3d 98, 102 (5th Cir, 1995)), nor is a court clerk immune from suit (Raitport v. Provident Nat. Bank, 451 Fed Supp 522, 534-35 (E.D. Pa, 1978)).
     Further, Plaintiff has pursued every conceivable remedy against Defendant Allison within the State. There is apparently no authority overseeing said Defendant save the judicial Defendants themselves, and complaint therewith falls upon deaf ears, and he has filed twice for supervisory control over said Defendant and been denied. Plaintiff has exhausted all conceivable remedies against Defendant Allison, as well as against all other Defendants herein, and for the Court to determine that Plaintiff has not is in blatant disregard of the actual content of Plaintiff's complaint.
     Consequently, Plaintiff objects to the Court's recommendations of dismissal.
    VII. Conclusion
     Based upon the foregoing, the Court's Findings and Recommendations are based upon an incomplete review of the record and upon the omission of considerations of law, in particular the authority pursuant to the RICO Act. Simply put, the Court's opinions are flawed and its conclusions lack foundation to be acted upon. As such, Plaintiff objects to the Court's Findings and Recommendations and requests instead that the Court grant him leave to file a second amended complaint in order to join issues presented between his First Amended Complaint and Addendum, as well as to provide additional information that has not yet been presented to the Court.

     Plaintiff above named does hereby attest under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of his ability to present and that this is respectfully submitted on the 12th day of March, 2010.

Modification of This Site

In addition to the preceding legal notice, I have also had my conditions changed to impose a restraint upon my freedom of expression, specifically directing me to modify this site to remove all instances of my so-called "victim's" or family's names or contact information. Aside from all of this being information that has been online for over six years as of this writing, this will now require me to extensively edit all of my previous entries.
This will be a time consuming process and will not be able to be accomplished in short order. I will endeavor to comply, admittedly under protest, but anyone who has read this blog knows that what I have entered is verbose and will take some time to edit in full. Truth is, I may have to retain the assistance of someone else to check the blog on my behalf to remove all questionable content as a third party. Regardless, this will take time, and I ask for anyone who has a genuine interest in this issue to take whatever *legal* avenues they may feel appropriate to address this gross infringement of civil liberties, because as of this point in time, I am prohibited from doing so.

Public Notice

This serves as notice that the Board of Directors needs to meet as soon as possible to discuss replacing myself as President of the corporation and Chair of the Board of Directors, as I am as of today legally prohibited to go anyplace where there is a "reasonable expectation" that children may be present. I would suggest the other Board members discuss a time and place for such meeting, as I will be unable to attend.

Quicky

Just as a quick update, the laptop was supposed to be returned yesterday, but I received a call from Dave Edwards saying the computer was with the "Department of Homeland Security". Even my attorney agrees that this is extreme and noone I have talked to seems to understand what Edwards is up to, but under the circumstances, it does not seem good... Hopefully, I can post an all clear soon, but as it stands, the seizure without a warrant of my laptop is still a pending issue and coming into Christmas with the potential of being incarcerated over the holidays...

Quick Update

Just as a method of protecting myself, I am making public notice that today, Dave Edwards of Probation and Parole seized my computer laptop, and intends to keep it from me for at least until Tuesday of this next week. The specific reason for the seizure is that a friend used the computer to access pornography, which I reported and which the friend has come forth and admitted to. But this is being used as an excuse to remove the computer from my custody, and to conduct a search of it outside my presence.
If this is a legitimate search, there will be nothing to find. I do not use my computer to search for porn or view it. And I cannot recall (certainly not in the recent past) when the last time was that I have inadvertently had a pop-up open on something inappropriate (which again, I have reported in the past, as necessary). But considering my history with local officials, knowing that I was set-up on a false charge once before, I am greatly concerned that the computer was taken to be inspected without my presence. This several day obstruction makes it difficult for me to know what could be potentially placed on the computer when it is not in my custody.
I have cooperated and been very clear that I have nothing to hide - but this is very disconcerting the way it was done. There is also some concern because I was working on legal work that I now have no access to, and this could be used to bar my access from that legal work. I am as such posting here that a malicious act has been taken and will update if this resolves without further complications. If I do not post here by sometime next week, then anyone reading this can assume that something was concocted and I have been taken into custody yet again...

New Court Filing

    Last time I filed an action (my petition for writ of habeas), I was arrested the next day and incarcerated for six weeks while the powers-that-be tried to retun me to prison. That may well happen again, but I am being left with little choice - in order to try to get past the obstructions by the local court, obstructions that have barred me proceeding in a simple suit to recover my property, I am being forced to take steps to further that claim - and in this instance, the only thing left for me to do is to try to move the claims, pursuant to RICO, to federal court.
        I expect that I will simply be arrested again, but I need to take these steps to try to preserve my civil rights... Anyone reading this, wish me luck...
        Attached is the action as I am filing it tomorrow. Hopefully I will be able to get it served before I am once again arrested...

----

Ron Glick
24 1st Avenue West #106B
Kalispell, MT 59901.
ron_glick@yahoo.com

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
MISSOULA DIVISION
_______

Ron Glick,    ) Cause No.
     )
    Plaintiff,    ) Complaint
     )
v.     )
     )
Eleventh Judicial District Court of )
Montana, Peg Allison, Stuart )
Stadler, Katherine Curtis, Ted )
Lympus, [*], aka [*], Tim Harris, Ray Evert, )
Estate of Earl Evert, aka Earl Evert, )
Wayne Evert, Gregory Paskell, )
Montana Supreme Court, Montana )
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, )
Dave Edwards, Heidi Ulbricht, and )
Does One through Twenty, )
     )
    Defendants.    )
_____________________________ )


STATEMENT

        Since in or around 2003, Plaintiff has been repeatedly deprived of substantial civil liberties through the coordinated efforts of Defendants who, acting as a racketeering enterprise and under color of State law, have sought to oppress and persecute Plaintiff in retaliation for pursuing a civil liberties complaint against local authorities. Plaintiff has been subjected to everything from vexatious litigation to deprivation of due process and constitutional protections to outright theft of his personal and business assets as a means by which to penalize him for protesting his mistreatment and deprive him of financial capacity to challenge said deprivations. Though some Defendants have acted under duress and coercion, and others have acted solely to preserve the status quo of corrupt authorities, the end result of a coordinated effort as part of a racketeering enterprise designed to deprive Plaintiff of his civil liberties and property remains the same, and Plaintiff is entitled to redress.
JURISDICTION

    This action is brought pursuant to 42 USCS Sections 1983 and 1443, in that this Court has authority over deprivation of civil liberties under color of State law, 28 USCS Sections 1343 and 1443, in that this Court has authority to assume jurisdiction over State causes wherein a defendant is deprived, under color of State law, of any right secured by the United States Constitution, 18 USCS Section 1961, et seq., in that this Court has authority to prevent and restrain the misconduct of individuals and agencies who act as a criminal racketeering enterprise, and the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Jurisdiction is founded under 28 USCS Sections 1331 and 1343(3) and (4) and the aforesaid Constitutional provisions.
BACKGROUND
    Plaintiff has had officers of Defendant Eleventh District Court, in and for Flathead County, State of Montana, obstruct his legal actions and, in coordination with and under the protection of other Defendants and other City of Kalispell officials, deprive Plaintiff of his civil liberties since in or around July, 2003. Such actions have been part of an ongoing vendetta against Plaintiff for pursuing civil liberty violation claims against City of Kalispell and County of Flathead officials, in direct violation of Plaintiff's First Amendment right to seek redress against government without reprisal nor molestation. Over the course of this longstanding crusade against Plaintiff, other non-official parties have been coerced and manipulated into supporting the actions of said officials, as well.
     Plaintiff established a nonprofit youth recreations program in or around October, 1996, originally named The Flipside CCG, though later changed to The Outpost CCG. Through years of solicited donations, Plaintiff acquired an inventory that well exceeded one million dollars. In or around April, 2002, Plaintiff and Defendant [*], then [*], who was also then Plaintiff's girlfriend, established a for-profit business, Arcadia, and parent corporation, Multiverse Enterprises, Incorporated, to work in partnership with the youth program. Though Plaintiff and Defendant [*] shared equal ownership of the for-profit business, Ms. [*] had no ownership claim over any of the youth program assets.
     Plaintiff's initial conflict with local authorities occurred on or about July 9, 2003, when a false allegation of sexual assault was made against him and an officer of the Kalispell Police Department, Myron Wilson, tampered with witnesses in order to secure a false report against Plaintiff. Plaintiff initiated a claim against said officer, only to be subsequently beset upon by officials of Kalispell and Flathead government agencies. Though the initial complaint against Plaintiff was dismissed and the original complainant recanted her allegation following closer of official investigations, harassments from said agencies continued and Plaintiff initiated legal action against City of Kalispell officials on or about October 30, 2003, and advanced his cause to full complaint against such parties on or about November 18, 2003 (Cause No. DV 03-572, Glick v. City of Kalispell, et al., Eleventh District Court of Montana). In response, Plaintiff's step-daughters were abducted on or about November 20, 2003, and held by the Flathead County Office of Child Protective Services, detained without contact with friends or family for weeks until the eldest step-daughter could be coerced to reassert her allegation against Plaintiff, said reassertment occurring on or about December 8, 2003.
     Following the abduction of his step-daughters, Plaintiff continued to pursue his complaint against City of Kalispell officials and, in absence of any appearance in the cause by the defendants, filed for default judgment on or about December 23, 2003, which Defendant Peg Allison blocked, alleging service had not properly been performed. Upon inquiry, said Defendant first insisted that no proof of service had been filed, but when challenged upon this point, said Defendant changed her reason for denying default judgment to be that allegedly no summons had ever been issued, even though Plaintiff had personally retrieved issued summons on the cause. When Plaintiff offered the testimony of Defendant [*], then [*], to attest to service of the summons, Defendant Allison insisted on speaking to her personally, and thereafter made direct threat against Defendant [*] that if she attested to service of summons, she would be prosecuted for perjury since Defendant [*] allegedly could not lawfully attest to service of lawfully issued summons, which Defendant Allison insisted had not been issued. In response to this intimidation, Defendant [*] called Plaintiff, literally terrified and in tears, refusing to file subpoena attesting to her service of the summons.
     Notably, Plaintiff has made numerous requests to Defendants Eleventh District Court and Allison for production of the court docket for Cause No. DV 03-572 to confirm or deny whether the summons had been removed from the court file, but said Defendants have refused to comply or even respond to such requests.
    Upon conclusion that Defendant Allison had tampered with a witness and was unconstitutionally barring Plaintiff's right of access to the courts and due process, and that Plaintiff could not possibly proceed within such jurisdiction, Plaintiff sent directly to Defendant Allison a notice of intent to remove the cause then filed to this Court's jurisdiction within thirty (30) days on or about January 28, 2004.
    Prior to the expiration of said deadline on or about February 27, 2004, Plaintiff was charged and arrested for the alleged sexual assault and witness tampering on or about February 20, 2004, and was thereafter continuously detained and deprived all access to court to pursue his complaint until after he was transferred into prison population in or around June, 2006. Since Plaintiff had only three years to have his legal service acknowledged, his suit was dismissed within Defendant Eleventh District Court.
    Upon arrest, Plaintiff sought support from Defendant [*], who possessed exculpatory evidence for Plaintiff's defense as well as fiscal support through their mutual business, and she was subsequently charged and arrested for alleged witness tampering on or about February 27, 2004, though was released upon her own recognizance after only a few days upon the stipulation that she would have no contact with and provide no support to Plaintiff, said directive issued by Defendant Ted Lympus. The charge of witness tampering was maintained against both Plaintiff and Defendant [*] until on or about July 7, 2005, dismissed without prejudice only four days prior to Plaintiff's trial, so that the charge could not be mentioned at trial (or so Plaintiff's trial counsel Eduardo Gurtierez Falla insisted), though it was clear that the charge could be brought again should Defendant [*] not conform to her prior restrictions of support of and contact with Plaintiff. Plaintiff thereafter was convicted and sentenced to twenty (20) years with fifteen (15) suspended through a mockery of trial, said conviction still being challenged within the State court system (Cause No. DC 04-066, State v Glick, Eleventh District Court of Montana).
     It should be noted that Defendant sought intervention against misconduct from Defendants Eleventh District Court and Katherine Curtis from Defendant Montana Supreme Court through application for writ of supervisory control in or around April, 2005 (Glick v. Curtis, Cause No. 05-261), but said Defendant refused to grant relief in spite of over forty independent reported violations, many of which involved blatant deprivation of due process by Defendant Curtis.
    This Court has previously ruled, after Plaintiff was finally able to file for relief in this Court in or around July, 2006, that Plaintiff is unable to challenge the specific issues of official misconduct heretofore cites since a civil action cannot be used to undermine a criminal conviction, and the initial suit had become intimately entwined into the criminal conviction as cause for vexatious prosecution (Glick v. [*], et al., Cause No. CV 06-112-M-DWM). Though Plaintiff does not seek of this Court a specific rescindment of that order, he does however believe that the specific circumstances of the civil suit that preceded the criminal cause, as well as circumstances that occurred during the course thereof, are relevant to this cause for establishment of a pattern of racketeering activity that extends well beyond the scope of the criminal cause. As such, Plaintiff references it herein as part of this cause. Additionally, since part of the relief sought in this cause is removal of said criminal cause to this Court's jurisdiction, it is appropriate to summarize said proceeding herein.
    In or around October, 2004, Plaintiff was contacted by Defendant Tim Harris, a patron of Plaintiff's and Defendant [*]'s business, who informed Plaintiff that Defendant [*] had closed said business and had left a sizable percentage of the youth program assets with him in trust until such time as Plaintiff could retrieve the property himself, though reportedly the contents of such deposit consisted of little of the for-profit business assets and only part of the youth program assets. Defendant [*] had at no time consulted with Plaintiff over this action and this action had allegedly been done because said Defendant was not permitted to have contact with Plaintiff pursuant to Defendant Lympus' order.
    Plaintiff has since learned that Defendant [*] maintained a storage unit wherein she stored the physical assets which she had retained, with the declared intent to reopen a new business, though said Defendant had also been selling off portions of said property piecemeal for personal gain. Additionally, it has been discovered by Plaintiff that said Defendant has retained numerous boxes of assets which belonged solely to Plaintiff's youth program of which said Defendant has been using to sell off for personal gain, as well.
     Defendant Harris later proved duplicitous and the majority of the property he held was left, without notice or agreement, with a nonprofit organization, Special Friends Advocacy Program, who notified Plaintiff that he had a limited time to have the property retrieved or forfeit claim thereof. Defendant Harris, by self-admission, retained some of the assets for himself and destroyed parts of the property out of spite rather than relinquish it.
    Plaintiff thereafter contracted with Defendant Ray Evert to have the property stored by his father, Defendant Earl Evert, in exchange for legal and clerical work Plaintiff performed for Defendant Ray Evert. Ultimately, Defendants Ray and Earl Evert also proved untrustworthy, as Defendant Ray Evert expended efforts to seize the property for himself and Defendant Earl Evert would not respond to efforts to bypass Defendant Ray Evert's duplicity.
    Prompted by the successive abuses of his property and entitlements, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants [*], Harris, Ray Evert and Earl Evert in or around November, 2007, in Dawson County where he was at the time detained. Plaintiff thereafter had Defendants Ray and Earl Evert served on or about December 22 and 26, 2007, respectively. When neither Defendant filed response to the complaint, Plaintiff sought default judgment against them on or about January 28, 2008. Though Defendant Earl Evert managed to avoid default through an eleventh-hour filing by his son, Defendant Wayne Evert, Defendant Ray Evert has never to date filed a response of any kind, and default judgment should properly have been entered against him, though to date never has.
     Defendant Earl Evert's eleventh hour pleading was actually filed by Defendant Wayne Evert, who had assumed power of attorney over Defendant Earl Evert to defend his father's cause. However, in addition to such filing, Defendant Wayne Evert also attempted to extort money from Plaintiff for the safety of his property and made threats to dispose of the property should the extortion not be paid. Further, Plaintiff has learned independently that, when Plaintiff refused to comply with said extortion, that said Defendant attempted to sell the property by piecemeal, of which Plaintiff has no way to at this time affirm as to what degree said Defendant may have been successful or not. Reportedly, at least part of Plaintiff's property still remains with said Defendant, though.
    On or about March 28, 2008, the Dawson County District Court, on motion of Defendant Earl Evert's later appointed counsel, Defendant Gregory Paskell, ordered venue transferred to Flathead County and the jurisdiction of Defendant Eleventh District Court without acting upon the motion for default judgment against Defendant Ray Evert and other outstanding issues. Plaintiff had objected to this transfer, citing hid federal claim against City of Kalispell and Flathead County officials, including many of the Defendants in this cause of action, stating specifically that Plaintiff “cannot receive a fair nor impartial hearing in Flathead County due to the bias and prejudice of officials therein” (Plaintiff's Response to Defendant Earl Evert's Motion For Change of Venue, et seq., Cause No. 07-128, Glick v. [*], et al. (Seventh District Court of Montana, transferred to Defendant Eleventh District Court as Cause No. DV 08-391)). This objection was clearly disregarded and Plaintiff's forewarning has come to pass.
    Prior to transfer, Plaintiff had filed to remove Defendant Paskell for conflict of interest, since he had previously represented Defendant [*] and had once before withdrawn for such conflict in the divorce proceedings between Ms. [*] and [*] for this exact reason and, by necessity, Defendant Paskell would need to work against the interests of Ms. [*] in pursuit of the rights of his current clients, Defendants Ray, Earl and Wayne Evert, such split of loyalty being impermissible. Defendant Stuart Stadler issued an order on or about April 15, 2008, denying said motion. This motion was noticeably filed well after the motion for default judgment against Defendant Ray Evert, but to date, no ruling has been issued pursuant to this preexisting motion.
    Since transfer to Defendant Eleventh District Court, Plaintiff has additionally sought issuance of new summonses for Defendants [*] and Harris, who remain unserved, but Defendant Allison has refused to issue such. Additionally, Plaintiff has filed numerous motions that have largely been obstructed and denied in absence of law and precedent, including acts of conspiracy between Defendants Eleventh District Court, Allison, Stadler and Paskell to conceal the death of Defendant Earl Evert, and Defendants Allison and Stadler to tamper with official records.
    Defendant Earl Evert died on or about May 31, 2008. Defendant Paskell had a duty to report such death to Plaintiff, but failed to do so, though did notify Defendant Eleventh District Court and, presumably Defendants Allison and Stadler. After Plaintiff learned of Defendant Earl Evert's death through an independent source in or around November, 2008, Plaintiff sought record of whether an official estate had been filed through both Defendants Allison and Paskell, yet both ignored his request for information. Plaintiff believes and thereon alleges that Defendant Earl Evert's death was kept from Plaintiff to aid in Defendant Wayne Evert's efforts to conceal his father's property, which Plaintiff has learned had been transferred to said Defendant's name immediately prior to Defendant Earl Evert's death, before a claim against Defendant Estate of Earl Evert could be lawfully made by Plaintiff.
    The delays caused by said Defendants effectively barred Plaintiff from making a claim pursuant to Montana estate law so that separate suit is necessitated to claim said assets. Additionally, Plaintiff has been informed by Defendant Paskell that no official estate was filed because Defendant Earl Evert died “penniless”, which is in direct opposition to the official records concerning property transferred from Defendant Earl Evert's name by Defendant Wayne Evert, which further implicates all of said Defendants in criminal fraud.
     Still further, as part of the machination to deprive Plaintiff of claim against Defendant Estate of Earl Evert, Defendant Allison, in collaboration with Defendant Stadler, tampered with official court records to assist in concealing said death, effectively depriving Plaintiff of any pretense of due process as consequence. On or about May 15, 2008, approximately two weeks prior to Defendant Earl Evert's death, Plaintiff filed two motions with Defendant Eleventh District Court: a motion for judgment on the pleadings against Defendant Earl Evert, upon the grounds that said Defendant's response admitted to all the necessary material elements necessary for judgment against him, ie, that he had taken possession of Plaintiff's property and continued to hold such pursuant to agreement, and a motion to amend the complaint to name Doe One in said complaint as Defendant Wayne Evert. No response was ever filed to either motion, and Plaintiff subsequently filed for default rulings in his favor on or about June 9, 2008. All motions were held in limbo until on or about August 1, 2008, when Defendant Stadler subsequently denied the motion for judgment on the pleadings, modified the motion to amend to require Plaintiff to refile his complaint, and denied the motion for default judgment upon the pretense that the issue was rendered moot by the rulings to the prior motions.
     A subsequent acquisition of the court docket and records established that Defendant Allison, in collaberation with Defendant Stadler, had actually tampered with records and manipulated the proceedings to assure Plaintiff would not prevail and to conceal the fact of Defendant Earl Evert's death. Said court docket, supported by a separate letter from Defendant Allison, prove that Defendant Allison removed the motions for judgment on the pleadings and to amend from their date of receipt on or about May 19, 2008, until on or about July 29, 2008, and presumably reported to Defendant Paskell that he had no need to file responses since said motions would not be docketed. Defendant Allison acknowledged in a separate letter that she had kept the summons sent for issuance that had accompanied said motions on her desk, and presumably kept the motions there as well.
    Additionally, said letter also affirmed that the motion for default rulings had arrived while said Defendant was out of town, and as such said motion was entered on the docket without Defendant Allison's knowledge. This motion was only docketed and scheduled for hearing because Defendant Allison was not present to remove it from the court file, as well. The records demonstrate thereafter that the motion to dismiss was reviewed by Defendant Stadler on or about July 3, 2008, but was returned to Defendant Allison without being ruled upon. Clearly, it was returned to Defendant Allison with instructions to handle it in the same manner as the prior two motions, but said Defendant was unable to delete an entry made into the computerized docket records.
    Since entry onto the docket was not deletable, Defendant Allison and Stadler conspired to assure that the two motions referenced in the motion to dismiss would be re-entered in the docket on or about July 29, 2008, so that Defendant Stadler could summarily deny them on or about August 1, 2009.
     However, Defendant Stadler's order defied all pretense of jurisprudence. He altered the motion to amend to be a motion to file an amended complaint, an act needless to simply amend the identity of a defendant, and which would have effectively removed Plaintiff's default judgment claim against Defendant Ray Evert and any potential claim against Defendant Earl Evert, since said Defendant had since died (of which Plaintiff had willfully been kept ignorant) and Plaintiff could not serve a deceased party. Further, Defendant Stadler denied the motion for judgment on the pleadings by omitting critical language in Defendant Earl Evert's response. Still further, Defendant Stadler denied the motion for default rulings upon the pretense that the motions in question had now been ruled upon, ignoring that the motion for default rulings had been filed well in advance of such rulings and that Plaintiff was entitled to relief automatically in any claim that was undisputed by defense. Essentially, Defendant Stadler, who was supposed to act as impartial magistrate, acted as co-counsel to the defendants in the cause by asserting legal defense and manipulating due process to assure that Plaintiff's relief would not be granted, to further keep Plaintiff ignorant of the status of Defendant Earl Evert and to further obstruct the cause of action from speedy resolution.
     To implicate Defendants further, said ruling by Defendant Stadler was actually kept out of the docket as well, and was only returned to the docket on or about August 15, 2008, upon receipt by Defendant Eleventh District Court of an application for writ of supervisory control filed with Defendant Montana Supreme Court, to which a copy of said ruling was attached.
     The records clearly establish a timeline in this instance. Plaintiff's motions were received by Defendant Eleventh District Court on or about May 19, 2008, and were subsequently removed from the docket. Defendant Allison acknowledged keeping documents properly contained in the court's docket on her desk during this time. Said docket further establishes that Plaintiff's motion for default rulings was received by Defendant Eleventh District Court on June 12, 2008, and was docketed and scheduled for hearing on or about June 17, 2008. Court records further establish that said motion was forwarded to Defendant Stadler on or about July 3, 2008, and that the motion was returned to the court clerk's office without being ruled upon. The court docket thereafter demonstrates that the motions previously removed were returned to the court docket on or about July 29, 2008, in time to be ruled upon by Defendant Stadler on or about August 1, 2008. Further, the complete and total absence of any response being filed by Defendant Paskell clearly indicates a preexisting knowledge that the motions had not been docketed, since otherwise he would dutifully have filed responses in defense of his clients.
     Plaintiff filed two separate applications for writ of supervisory control with Defendant Montana Supreme Court over these issues, but in each instance said Defendant acted in defense of the other Defendants in this cause. In spite of blatant violations of standards of conduct and criminal misconduct by said Defendants, Defendant Montana Supreme Court acted in conspiracy to shelter said Defendants from the consequences of their criminal misconduct. Collectively, Plaintiff has filed three separate applications for writ of supervisory control over Defendants, and in each instance, Defendant Montana Supreme Court has acted to defend and shelter the misconduct of Defendant Eleventh District Court officials.
     Further, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant Paskell with Defendant Office of Discliplinary Counsel, to which Defendant Paskell blatantly perjured himself by attesting to multiple issues that were readily impeachable by official records, yet Defendant Office of Disciplinary Counsel defended the misconduct of Defendant Paskell. Plaintiff had previously filed numerous complaints against other attorneys involved in his criminal prosecution, and had innumerable issues of misconduct also dismissed by Defendant Office of Disciplinary Counsel. Collectively, Plaintiff has filed five separate complaints of misconduct against attorneys acting in conspiracy with Defendant Eleventh District Court officials, and in each instance, Defendant Office of Disciplinary Counsel has acted to defend and shelter the misconduct of said attorneys, just as they have in the case of Defendant Paskell.
     Upon release from prison, Plaintiff was remanded to the custody of the Montana Department of Adult Probation and Parole for a fifteen (15) year probation sentence, that was not specifically imposed by his sentencing court, and placed under the authority of Defendant Dave Edwards. From the time of Plaintiff's release, said Defendant acted to provoke and harass Plaintiff, attempting to obstruct his rights to pursue his legal claims and his capacity to support himself, as well as manipulating circumstances of that said Defendant could violate Plaintiff's release and return him to prison.
    Upon learning of Plaintiff's suit against Defendant [*], Defendant Edwards contacted her and provoked in her an irrational fear of Plaintiff, convincing Defendant [*] that Plaintiff was seeking her out to harm her. Defendant Edwards later claimed that Defendant [*] had contacted him because she had learned of Plaintiff's efforts to contact her and ordered Plaintiff to cease all attempts to contact her. When Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant Edwards for exceeding his authority, said Defendant instructed Defendant [*] to file a restraining order to further obstruct Plaintiff from pursuing or settling his claim against Defendant [*], which was served upon Plaintiff on or about April 15, 2009 ([*] v. Glick, Cause No. CV 2009-19-OP, Kalispell Municipal Court).
     Defendant [*]'s application for order of protection included numerous perjured statements, and Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant [*]'s petition on or about April 20, 2009, as well as having subpoenas issued against Defendant Edwards and others.
     Following these blatant obstructions and clear intent to attempt to violate him, Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on or about April 22, 2009, challenging the legality of his commitment to probation amongst other issues. Learning of this petition, Defendant Edwards filed to revoke Plaintiff's probation and had a warrant issued for his arrest on or about April 23, 2009, upon the pretense that Plaintiff had not successfully obtained employment in two months after release, ignoring Plaintiff's ninety (90) day application period for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) that was still pending, his application for assistance through Vocational Rehabilitation for retraining and a recessed economy where people in the region had been out of work six months to a year, and had not enrolled in allegedly court appointed treatment, despite absence of the court ordered prerequisite of a counselor's recommendation. Subsequently, Defendant Edwards called Social Security instructing them to cancel his application because he had been arrested and contacted Vocational Rehabilitation claiming that I was no longer eligible for services because Plaintiff had been denied SSI.
    Incidentally, Defendant Edward's contact with Social Security did not cancel Plaintiff's claim and he was accepted for SSI benefits on or about May 15, 2009, though his efforts to attempt to sabotage such application cannot be overlooked. As a direct result of this approval, the efforts to revoke Plaintiff were undermined and he was released from custody after approximately six weeks of detention on or about June 2, 2009, with the condition that Plaintiff was now required to enroll in and pay for sex offender treatment.
     During the course of Plaintiff's incarceration, he was permitted only a video conference appearance at the hearing on Defendant [*]'s order of protection, which occurred over two hearing dates. Defendant Edwards defied his subpoena and did not appear at either, and Defendant Heidi Ulbricht, who oversaw the proceedings, would not enforce his appearance. Further, Defendant Ulbricht acted completely contrary to law by having ex parte communications with Defendant [*] prior to the commencement of the second hearing in which she offered assurances to Defendant [*] that her restraining order would be granted, as witnessed by one of Plaintiff's witnesses present in the courtroom. Still further, Defendant Ulbricht quashed two other subpoenas, one for production of records and another for the appearance of Melvin Williams, both of which, coupled with the subpoena for Defendant Edwards, would have impeached the testimony of Defendant [*] at the hearing.
    It was made abundantly clear during the course of the proceedings that Defendant [*] was acting under direction from someone else, yet would not reveal the identity of such when asked, and Defendant Ulbricht would not compel the identity, and that her only real reason is seeking the order of protection was to obstruct the lawsuit Plaintiff had pending against her. Further, not only did Defendant Ulbricht bar introduction of evidence that would impeach Defendant [*], Defendant Ulbricht also suppressed any evidence or cross-examination that would demonstrate that Defendant [*]'s fears had been engendered by others, not by Plaintiff.
    It was effectively clear that Defendant Ulbricht had a prejudicial predisposition to decide in favor of Defendant [*]. This was made even more abundantly clear when Defendant Ulbricht, in issuing her ruling, could not summarize any actual reason for granting the order of protection, and even stumbled upon reading the law when required to state that there was a reasonable apprehension of harm. In spite of this, Defendant Ulbricht granted the order of protection, though could not compel Plaintiff to not continue his lawsuit. This cause is presently being appealed before Defendant Curtis ([*] v. Glick, Cause No. DR-09-396B, Eleventh District Court).
    As it presently stands, Defendant is unable to pursue even the simplest of civil actions. Defendant Eleventh District Court officials are actively obstructing service of unserved defendants by refusing to issue summons, and otherwise obstructing the cause of action from proceeding. Said Defendants have demonstrated that they have no intention of providing Plaintiff with even a modicum of fair hearing, and remain actively in pursuit of finding cause to return Plaintiff to prison in order to further obstruct his legal access and civil liberties. Further, said Defendants have demonstrated a capacity for manipulating others into furthering their objectives, through both coercion and duplicity. Still further, considering that Defendants have retaliated to previous legal filings by having Plaintiff arrested, he anticipates that he will yet again be deprived of his liberty as consequence for filing this action, which will likely impede his constitutional right of access to the courts.
     Plaintiff has exhausted every reasonable measure to reach settlement on his property suit, but he has met with further obstructions from other Defendants in this, as well. Defendant Paskell has repeatedly caused delays in reaching settlement by many bad faith gestures of settlement, while his client, Defendant Wayne Evert, has met with Defendants Harris and [*] to provoke them into refusing to settle. In the instance of Defendant Harris, this occurred after a settlement had been reached and Plaintiff had simply been waiting for Defendant Harris to sign the settlement agreement. All of this collectively contributes to the long-standing effort to assure that Plaintiff will remain financially bereft, a state that has been the objective of Defendant Eleventh District Court officials and other local authorities for nearly six years now.
     Individually, each of the Defendants' actions as cited herein have been contrary to law. Collectively, they demonstrate a pattern of abuse that seeks one universal purpose: the oppression and harm of Plaintiff. Though not all Defendants have acted in full knowledge of the actions nor motivations of others, this is not necessary in a conspiracy, only that conspirators' conduct is in pursuit of a common cause. That this conduct was part of a larger criminal enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, including but not limited to witness tampering, coercion, obstruction of due process, and other crimes, that have caused injury to Plaintiff and his property is equally indisputable. Further, the actions of Defendants have grossly undermined the integrity of this country's judicial and legal system, and such infringements upon liberty entitle Plaintiff to redress.
PARTIES

    1. Plaintiff Ron Glick is and was at all times relevant a citizen of the United States and resident of the State of Montana.
    2. Defendant Eleventh Judicial District Court (hereafter “DC”) is a duly sanctioned court formed and operated under the laws of the State of Montana and is sued in its official capacity.
    3. Defendant Peg Allison (hereafter “Allison”), at all times referred to herein, is Court Clerk for Defendant DC and is sued in her individual and official capacities.
    4. Defendant Stuart Stadler (hereafter “Stadler”), at all times referred to herein, is and was a lawfully elected district court judge of Defendant DC, and is sued in his individual and official capacities.
    5.Defendant Katherine Curtis (hereafter “Curtis”), at all times referred to herein, is and was a lawfully elected district court judge of Defendant DC, and is sued in her individual and official capacities.
    6. Defendant Ted Lympus (hereafter “Lympus”), at all times referred to herein, is and was a lawfully elected district court judge of Defendant DC, and is sued in his individual and official capacities.
    7. Defendant [*], aka [*] (hereafter “[*]”), at all times referred to herein, is and was a resident of Flathead County, State of Montana.
    8. Defendant Tim Harris (hereafter “Harris”), at all times referred to herein, is and was a resident of Flathead County, State of Montana.
    9. Defendant Ray Evert (hereafter “Evert 1”), at all times referred to herein, is and was a resident of the State of Montana.
    10. Defendant Estate of Earl Evert (hereafter “Evert 2”) is the estate of the deceased Earl Evert, who prior to his death, was a resident of Flathead County, State of Montana.
    11. Defendant Wayne Evert (hereafter “Evert 3”), at all times referred to herein, is and was a resident of Flathead County, State of Montana.
    12. Defendant Gregory Paskell (hereafter “Paskell”) is a legally licensed attorney in the State of Montana who formerly practiced law in Flathead County, State of Montana.
    13. Defendant Montana Supreme Court (hereafter “SC) is a duly sanctioned court formed and operated under the laws of the State of Montana and is sued in its official capacity.
    14. Defendant Office of Disciplinary Counsel (hereafter “ODC”) is a legal office of the State of Montana, formed and operated under the laws of said State, and is sued in its official capacity.
    15. Defendant Heidi Ulbricht, at all times referred to herein, is and was a lawfully elected city court judge of the City of Kalispell, and is sued in her individual and official capacities.
    16. Defendant Dave Edwards, at all times referred to herein, is and was a probation and parole officer employed by the Montana Department of Probation and Parole, and is sued in his individual and official capacities.
    17. The true names and capacities of Does One through Twenty are presently unknown to Plaintiff. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based upon such belief alleges, that each of said Doe Defendants is responsible for the damages suffered by Plaintiff. Leave of the Court will be sought to amend this complaint to include the true names and capacities of said Doe Defendants as soon as such information becomes known to Defendant.
GENERAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
    18. Plaintiff has been subjected to innumerable violations of his civil liberty as a direct consequence of his seeking legal redress against local government authorities since in or around July, 2003, and Defendants named herein are both directly and indirectly responsible for such, as cited heretofore.
    19. Plaintiff has been deprived constitutional access to court on several occasions, including but not limited to detention in a Flathead County detention facility where he was deprived all contact with Defendant Eleventh District Court to pursue his civil claims between February, 2004, and December, 2005, and Defendants named herein are both directly and indirectly responsible for such, as cited heretofore.
    20. Plaintiff has been deprived of due process in innumerable instances, including but not limited to tampering with court records, obstruction of lawfully filed motions, and coordinated efforts to deprive Plaintiff of relief, and Defendants named herein are both directly and indirectly responsible for such, as cited heretofore.
    21. Plaintiff has been victimized by coordinated racketeering activity designed to oppress him and to deprive him of assets, property and support, and Defendants named herein are both directly and indirectly responsible for such, as cited heretofore.
    22. Plaintiff is entitled to the return of his property and/or reimbursement for its loss, yet has been consistently obstructed in this liberty interest, and Defendants named herein are both directly and indirectly responsible for such, as cited heretofore.
    23. Plaintiff has been subjected to innumerable instances of criminal fraud and misconduct which have deprived him of any hope of fair and impartial administration of justice within the State of Montana, and Defendants named herein are both directly and indirectly responsible for such, as cited heretofore.
    24. Defendants have instigated injustices not only designed to oppress Plaintiff, but to additionally perpetuate the continued abuses of discretion and authority rampant in Flathead County, Montana, described by many as a “Good Ol' Boy” system, demonstrating that Defendants cannot maintain impartiality within their own jurisdiction.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
    25. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding above as though set forth herein in full.
    26. This cause of action is brought pursuant to the previously cited jurisdictions set forth heretofore.
    27. The above described acts and omissions of Defendants, and each of them, under color of state law, constitute collaboration in a common goal, the oppression and defamation of Plaintiff and the deprivation to Plaintiff of his property interests, and though each Defendant may have been motivated by separate reasons to participate and may not have been aware of either all the participants or actions thereof, they were all knowledged that their actions were in collusion with others for the same purpose, constituting a chain conspiracy, violating Plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
    28. Defendants, in the commission of their acts and omissions, used invidious discrimination of Plaintiff's indigent social status, a condition created by the very deprivations at issue in depriving Plaintiff of his property, to perpetuate their misconduct without opposition.
    29. As a direct and proximate result of acts, omissions and constitutional violations alleged above, Plaintiff has suffered and is entitled to damages.
    30. In doing the acts and making the omissions alleged herein, Defendants acted maliciously and with wanton disregard for the rights, needs and feelings of Plaintiff and by reason thereof, Plaintiff requests punitive damages in the amount of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) per Defendant.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
    31. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding above as though set forth herein in full.
    32. This cause of action is brought pursuant to the previously cited jurisdictions set forth heretofore.
    33. The above described acts and omissions of Defendants, and each of them, under color of state law, constitute collaboration in a criminal enterprise, and though each Defendant may have been motivated by separate reasons to participate and may not have been aware of either all the participants or actions thereof, they were all knowledged that their actions were in collusion with others for the same purpose, constituting a racketeering organization, violating Plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
    34. Defendants, in the commission of their acts and omissions, used invidious discrimination of Plaintiff's indigent social status, a condition created by the very deprivations at issue in depriving Plaintiff of his property, to perpetuate their misconduct without opposition.
    35. As a direct and proximate result of acts, omissions and constitutional violations alleged above, Plaintiff has suffered and is entitled to damages.
    36. In doing the acts and making the omissions alleged herein, Defendants acted maliciously and with wanton disregard for the rights, needs and feelings of Plaintiff and by reason thereof, Plaintiff requests punitive damages in the amount of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) per Defendant.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
    37. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding above as though set forth herein in full.
    38. This cause of action is brought pursuant to the previously cited jurisdictions set forth heretofore.
    39. The above described acts and omissions of Defendants, and each of them, under color of state law, constitute collaborated effort to deprive Plaintiff of his civil rights, violating Plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
    40. Defendants, in the commission of their acts and omissions, used invidious discrimination of Plaintiff's indigent social status, a condition created by the very deprivations at issue in depriving Plaintiff of his property, to perpetuate their misconduct without opposition.
    41. As a direct and proximate result of acts, omissions and constitutional violations alleged above, Plaintiff has suffered and is entitled to damages.
    42. In doing the acts and making the omissions alleged herein, Defendants acted maliciously and with wanton disregard for the rights, needs and feelings of Plaintiff and by reason thereof, Plaintiff requests punitive damages in the amount of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) per Defendant.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
    43. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding above as though set forth herein in full.
    44. This cause of action is brought pursuant to the previously cited jurisdictions set forth heretofore.
    45. The above described acts and omissions of Defendants, and each of them, under color of state law, constitute collaborated efforts to deprive Plaintiff of his rightful property, constituting deprivation of Plaintiff's liberty interest in owning property, violating Plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
    46. Defendants, in the commission of their acts and omissions, used invidious discrimination of Plaintiff's indigent social status, a condition created by the very deprivations at issue in depriving Plaintiff of his property, to perpetuate their misconduct without opposition.
    47. As a direct and proximate result of acts, omissions and constitutional violations alleged above, Plaintiff has suffered and is entitled to damages.
    48. In doing the acts and making the omissions alleged herein, Defendants acted maliciously and with wanton disregard for the rights, needs and feelings of Plaintiff and by reason thereof, Plaintiff requests punitive damages in the amount of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) per Defendant.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
    49. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding above as though set forth herein in full.
    50. This cause of action is brought pursuant to the previously cited jurisdictions set forth heretofore.
    51. The above described acts and omissions of Defendants, and each of them, under color of state law, have demonstrated an intent and purpose in oppressing Plaintiff and denying him access to basic civil liberties, constituting a gross abuse of discretion and authority, violating Plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
    52. Defendants' foregoing acts and omissions have demonstrated a clearly credible history of retaliation for Plaintiff's actions taken in defense of his civil liberties, and has effectively shown a pattern of behavior that is reasonably indicative that future abuses will occur.
    53. Thereupon, there is a real and immediate credible threat that Plaintiff will be wronged again and a sufficient likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury should Defendants be permitted to retain jurisdiction, control or influence over Plaintiff.
    54. As a direct and proximate result of acts, omissions and constitutional violations alleged above, Plaintiff has suffered and is entitled to relief.
    55. In doing the acts and making the omissions alleged herein, Defendants acted maliciously and with wanton disregard for the rights, needs and feelings of Plaintiff and by reason thereof, Plaintiff requests injunctive relief through order of the Court prohibiting any Defendant or agent, associate, representative, employee or supervisory authority thereof from maintaining jurisdiction, control or influence over Plaintiff or any witness that Plaintiff may have cause to name, and to remand all active and future causes of action presently or in the future litigated in the State of Montana in which said Defendants or agent, associate, representative, employee or supervisory authority thereof is named or involved, to this Court's jurisdiction.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
    56. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding above as though set forth herein in full.
    57. This cause of action is brought pursuant to the previously cited jurisdictions set forth heretofore.
    58. Plaintiff has sufficient cause to believe that many of Defendants' actions, under color of State law, remain unknown and undiscovered, though Plaintiff has expectation of learning of such acts and omissions that are believed to be in violation of Plaintiff's liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
    59. As a direct and proximate result of acts, omissions and constitutional violations alleged above, Plaintiff is expected to suffer and will be entitled to damages.
    61. In doing the acts and making the omissions alleged herein, Defendants will have acted maliciously and with wanton disregard for the rights, needs and feelings of Plaintiff and by reason thereof, Plaintiff would request appropriate damages.
CONCLUSION
     Plaintiff has continuously sought to defend his own civil liberties for nearly six years, yet in every instance that he has tried, Defendants have come forth to retaliate against him and further deprive him of his liberty interests. In spite of all he has endured and lost, Plaintiff continues to try to pursue legal remedies to these conflicts, yet in each instance, Defendants abuse their positions, authorities and opportunities to further the objective of invidiously persecuting Plaintiff. And despite Plaintiff's best efforts to seek intervention of proper authorities, repeatedly he has been denied any form of proper relief.
     Simply put, Plaintiff is a United States citizen entitled to constitutional protections and liberties that he has been repeatedly denied in order to perpetuate a corrupt authority entrenched in Montana. And when Plaintiff has sought assistance from supervisory authorities, those same authorities have acted to empower the corruption rather than to take the proper legal measures necessary to restore Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Effectively, Plaintiff is a political prisoner in his own country, where the rights and privileges of all other citizens do not apply to him.
     Plaintiff continues to fight against an unjust conviction wherein he was deprived all pretense of constitutional protections, just as he strives to regain the property that he was unlawfully stripped of by others intent upon their own gains. Plaintiff has at every measure acted within the confines of law, yet he is faced by authorities and those empowered thereby who are not required to follow the law. Essentially, there is a blanket immunity when it comes to violating the law and constitutional provisions of America for anyone who acts specifically against Plaintiff.
     The underlying purpose in all of this is to oppress Plaintiff and to assure that he remains oppressed and incapable of standing against the corruption that has oppressed him. And the corrupt powers-that-be, of which many of the Defendants herein are counted in their number, are willing to permit any atrocity so long as the end result perpetuates their end-game, which is the continuance of the status quo, regardless of who has to be harmed to maintain the corrupt system. Plaintiff remains an outspoken opponent of the corrupt authorities in Montana, and as such has been victimized in order to disempower his capacity to fight back. Plaintiff has been labled with the worst conceivable crime in order to blacklist him and to make him an undesirable. It matters little that it is all based upon falsehood and manipulated, coerced evidence. All that matters in the end is the result: the utter ruination of an innocent man in order to preserve the financial gains of a corrupt government.
     To accomplish this goal, Defendants have formed a criminal enterprise using racketeering activities for the sole purpose of causing harm to Plaintiff and his property. This is a clear and blatant violation of Federal RICO law, and Plaintiff is entitled to both protection from this abuse and to damages for the harm that has been caused him.

     WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests relief as follows:
     A. Temporary, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief prohibiting Defendants, or agent, associate, representative, employee or supervisory authority thereof, from maintaining jurisdiction, control or influence over Plaintiff or any witness that Plaintiff may have cause to name, and to remand all active and future causes of action presently or in the future litigated in the State of Montana in which said Defendants, or agent, associate, representative, employee or supervisory authority thereof, is named or involved, to this Court's jurisdiction;
     B.    Punitive damages in the amount of four hundred thousand dollars ($400,000) per Defendant;
    C. Cost of suit herein, including any reasonable attorney fees which Plaintiff may accrue;
    D. Such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper.

     Plaintiff above named does hereby attest under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of his ability to present and that this is respectfully submitted on the 24th day of August, 2009.

        ___________________________________
         Ron Glick, Plaintiff