Wednesday, April 8, 2009

Civil Removal To Federal Court

    I am in the process of preparing a filing which will move my civil claim for the re-claiming of my business assets to U.S. District Court. I have every expectation to file this within the next couple of days (awaiting a form from the court to file in forma pauperis, ie, without prepayment of fees). I have provided the local district court clerk, Peg Allison, a window to prevent this motion from being filed, should she actually provide the summons she has refused to issue and grant default judgment against at least one outstanding party within the next couple of days. However, I do not expect the local authorities to suddenly start granting me the due process they have denied me for nearly six years now, so I expect that this motion will be filed.
     In anticipation of this, I am posting a copy of the test of the motion here for anyone interested to review. It aptly details the current obstructions of the local authorities, as well as provides a brief overview of the past obstructions as well.
     Please let me know if anyone has any questions.

Ron Glick
24 1st Avenue West, #223
Kalispell, MT 59901


Ron Glick, ) Cause No.
Plaintiff, )
) Motion To Remove State Cause To US District Court


[*], aka )
[*], Tim )
Harris, Ray Evert, )
Earl Evert, aka Estate )
Of Earl Evert, and )
Does One through )
Five, )
Defendants. )
     Comes now Plaintiff in the above entitled cause, pro se herein, to move of the Court to order the removal of Cause No. DV 08-391 from the Eleventh Judicial District Court, In and For Flathead County, to this Court’s jurisdiction, and to wit:


     Since in or around July, 2003, Plaintiff has been frequently harassed by officials representing the City of Kalispell and County of Flathead, Montana, who have sought to obstruct his civil liberties through abuse of their authoritative positions in defense of their own misconduct. Plaintiff has sought to resolve such conflicts through the legal system but has found himself subjected to molestations and retaliations from said officials, and even had friends and family members harassed and intimidated by said officials to undermine Plaintiff’s support. Worse still, private parties have taken advantage of the conflict between Plaintiff and said officials to attempt to deprive Plaintiff of his property and resources, forcing Plaintiff to file further legal actions to secure said assets. However, Plaintiff has been forced to pursue his claims for such assets under the jurisdiction of the selfsame officials who have been actively obstructing his civil liberties for nearly six years, and said officials continue to abuse their authority to obstruct Plaintiff’s rights to due process in pursuit of said claims. Plaintiff has sought supervisory control over Court officials through the Montana Supreme Court, but that court has acted to defend the misconduct of the lower court instead of intervening to preserve Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. As Plaintiff cannot proceed in any real capacity while subject to the whims of local corrupt court officials, he is left with no alternative but to seek removing the cause of action to this Court’s jurisdiction.


     This action is brought pursuant to 28 USCS Sections 1343 and 1443, in that this Court has authority to assume jurisdiction over State causes wherein a party is deprived, under color of State law, of any right secured by the United States Constitution, and 18 USCS Section 1961, et seq., in that this Court has jurisdiction to prevent and restrain the misconduct of individuals and agencies who act as a criminal racketeering enterprise.


     Plaintiff has had ongoing conflicts with officials in government within the City of Kalispell and County of Flathead, Montana, and specifically, in relevant matter to this cause, with officers of the Eleventh Judicial District of Montana (hereafter DC). Plaintiff has pursued every viable state action to resolve this conflict but relief has been denied by the Montana Supreme Court, in spite of documented evidence of felonious misconduct by DC officials. As a result, Plaintiff is left with no other legal recourse than to seek removal of the cause to this Court.
     On or about July 9, 2003, a false allegation of sexual assault was made against Plaintiff, which was investigated at the time of initial complaint by the Kalispell Police Department (hereafter “KPD”) and Child and Family Services (hereafter “CFS”). KPD’s initial investigation was closed, absent the discovery of “new evidence”, on or about September 4, 2003, and CFS’ investigation was subsequently closed on or about September 15, 2003, upon report from KPD of the police investigation being closed.
     During the course of KPD’s investigation though, a KPD officer had tampered with, threatened and intimidated witnesses, as well as maliciously maligned Plaintiff through dissimation of information known to be false, in an effort to coerce false testimony and support from them against Plaintiff, which resulted in Plaintiff making a written complaint and demand for damages against the City of Kalispell. Immediately following issuance of said demand, Plaintiff’s businesses were beset upon by numerous official harassments, which in itself eventually resulted in Plaintiff filing legal action against the City and agencies and officials thereof, first through the filing of a petition for production of KPD records on or about October 30, 2003, and thereafter in the filing of a full complaint on or about November 18, 2003 (Glick v. City of Kalispell, et al, Cause No. DV 03-572, 11th District Court of Montana, Flathead County). Notably, Plaintiff had had summonses issued personally to him upon filing of the initial petition, but the DC Clerk refused to issue additional summons when new defendants were added to the cause with the filing of the civil complaint.
     In further retaliation against Plaintiff during this period of time, both KPD’s and CFS’ investigations were re-opened in an effort to block Plaintiff’s access to record of said agencies on or about October 28, 2003, even though the original allegation had been recanted and no new evidence had been "discovered”. Further, Plaintiff’s step-daughters were abducted by CFS on or about November 20, 2003 (two days after the filing of the aforementioned civil complaint), even though there was no current allegation against Plaintiff from either daughter (only the eldest daughter had ever made an allegation against Plaintiff; the youngest had never made an allegation, at all). Through course of these separate actions, Plaintiff’s girlfriend and business partner, [*] ([*]), and her daughters were subjected to numerous threats and intimidations from CFS demanding that she support the allegation made against Plaintiff and to sever Plaintiff from his assets and resources     When no response was filed to either the petition or complaint, Plaintiff filed for default judgment on or about December 23, 2003. The DC Clerk, Peg Allison, blocked said default however by claiming that service had not been properly made upon the defendants of the cause (note: a clerk of court has no authority to raise such a defense on behalf of parties of a suit; the parties of the suit had to raise such a defense on their own, but failed to do so). Upon request for clarification by Plaintiff, Ms. Allison claimed that no proof of service had been filed in the cause, yet when Plaintiff assured Ms. Allison that he could provide copies of the proofs which he had personally filed with the DC, Ms. Allison changed her reason to the claim that no summons had ever been issued in the cause. When Plaintiff attested to having personally been issued summonses that had been attached to the original petitions for service, Ms. Allison requested to have Plaintiff arrange for her to speak with the process server, [*] ([*]), to confirm whether summonses had actually been served. However, when Ms. [*] ([*]) contacted Ms. Allison to attest to service of the summonses, Ms. Allison tampered with Ms. [*] ([*]) by threatening to have her arrested for perjury if she tried to attest to ever serving a “valid” summons upon any defendant in the cause. Ms. Allison’s threats were sufficient to intimidate Ms. [*] ([*]) into refusing to sign an affidavit attesting to serving the summonses.
     Notably, Plaintiff has made innumerable requests to Ms. Allison for production of the DC docket of Cause No. DV 03-572 to confirm or deny whether the summons had been removed from the court file, but Ms. Allison has refused to comply with such requests.
     On or about January 28, 2004, after weeks of attempting to convince Ms. Allison to withdraw her unlawful obstruction of the default judgment, Plaintiff sent a letter to Ms. Allison declaring his intent to move the cause to federal court, and to add Ms. Allison and several other officials and agencies who had acted against Plaintiff since the filing of the initial complaint, if Ms. Allison did not cease obstructing the default judgment. Plaintiff provided Ms. Allison a thirty (30) day deadline, set to expire on or about February 27, 2004.
     Instead of complying with Plaintiff’s demand, the local officials conspired to have Plaintiff arrested on or about February 20, 2004, a week prior to his deadline’s expiration. Such arrest occurred early eight months from the date of the original allegation on or about July 9, 2003, and nearly four months after said officials had re-opened the official investigations or about October 28, 2003. Plaintiff remained continuously incarcerated thereafter until on or about February 17, 2009.
    Plaintiff believes and thereon alleges that his arrest at such a late date was specifically intended to bar him from removing Cause No. DV 03-572 to this Court’s jurisdiction, since local officials had been unable to otherwise quash Plaintiff’s claims against them. Additionally, when Plaintiff sought exculpatory evidence and financial support through his business assets from Ms. [*] ([*]), Ms. [*] ([*]) was also arrested, for allegedly tampering with her daughter as a witness, on or about February 27, 2003, and all contact between Plaintiff and his business was severed. Ms. [*] ([*]) was subsequently released from custody under threat of being re-arrested should she, directly or indirectly, contact or support Plaintiff or provide him access to records or assets of their mutual business. Said charge, and its corresponding intimidations, were maintained over Ms. [*] ([*]) for nearly seventeen months, specifically until four days prior to Plaintiff’s trial on or about July 11, 2005 (over two years from the date of the original allegation and nearly seventeen months since Plaintiff’s arrest).
     It should be noted that Plaintiff sought supervisory control over the DC in or around 2005 (Glick v. Curtis, Cause No. 05-261, Montana Supreme Court), but the state supreme court refused to grant relief in spite of over forty independent reported violations. Following refusal of said court to intervene, Plaintiff was subsequently convicted through a kangaroo court trial and sentenced to twenty (20) years with fifteen (15) years suspended, and an additional fifteen (15) year probation sentence to be served simultaneously with his suspended sentence.
    It should be noted that though Plaintiff cites history involving his criminal conviction, he is fully cognizant that he cannot seek to undermine a criminal conviction through a civil action. As such, it is not his intent to seek of this Court to address the corresponding vexatious litigation against Plaintiff, but to provide this Court with the full history involved in the present issue.
     While Plaintiff awaited trial, and since Ms.[*] ([*]) was unable to contact Plaintiff due to obstructions by the local officials, Plaintiff’s business failed and was closed in or around September, 2003. Unable to contact Plaintiff about disposition of assets, Ms.[*] ([*]) independently chose to retain the majority of business assets, though did relinquish part of the assets to a mutual acquaintance, Tim Harris, who thereafter notified Plaintiff of Ms. [*]’s ([*]’s) actions. After Plaintiff was sentenced to prison, Mr. Harris attempted to seize Plaintiff’s property for himself, though finally relinquished the majority of said assets to another party in or around December, 2006. Plaintiff arranged separately for Earl Evert, the father of a fellow inmate, Ray Evert, to retrieve and store the property Mr. Harris relinquished. However, the Everts also proved duplicitous and attempted to bar Plaintiff access to his property, as well, apparently seeking to claim it for themselves. After years of fraudulent practices being made against him and agreements being breached, Plaintiff was forced to file suit in or around November, 2007, against Ms. [*] ([*]), Mr. Harris, and both Mr. Everts (Glick v. [*], et al, Cause No. DV 07-128, 7th District Court, Dawson County)(a true and correct copy of said suit attached hereafter attached hereafter as Exhibit A).
     Recognizing the potential obstructions that could result in Flathead County, Plaintiff initially filed suit in Dawson County where he was at that time confined. However, Earl Evert’s counsel, Gregory Paskell, successfully moved for the cause to be moved to Flathead County as Cause No. DV 08-391, in spite of Plaintiff’s forewarning that the cause could not be fairly heard there. And true to Plaintiff’s predictions, since the cause was transferred to Flathead County on or about March 20, 2008, it has been subject to numerous unlawful and unconstitutional obstructions from DC officials.
     As a whole, the DC has abused its authority over Plaintiff’s cause to deprive him of relief to which he was lawfully entitled. The DC has essentially assured that Plainitiff will never have a fair and impartial hearing upon any issue in this cause so long as Plaintiff could utilize the relief gained through this cause against the local authorities.
     As an example, Plaintiff sought to have Gregory Paskell removed due to a conflict of interest, since he had formerly represented [*] ([*]) and had admitted to such conflict in a separate cause, yet Judge Stewart Stadler refused to grant the relief sought.
     Additionally, the DC has refused to issue a default judgment against Ray Evert who has never responded to the complaint. Plaintiff filed for default upon Ray Evert prior to the cause being transferred, but the Dawson County court did not issue the default in light of the cause’s transfer. In spite of numerous requests to have such default issued, however, the DC has refused to do so now for over a year.
    Further, Ms. Allison has refused to even issue summons reflecting the new jurisdiction over the cause of action which were provided to her for issuance in or around May, 2008, since summonses issued by Dawson County were no longer valid due to the instructions to a served defendant to file responses with the wrong court; Though Plaintiff had successfully served defendants Earl and Ray Evert prior to the cause being transferred, he had not yet had Ms. [*] ([*]) or Mr. Harris served, nor could he proceed against said defendants without issuance of new summonses.
     Still Further, DC officials collaberated together with Mr. Paskell to conceal the death of Earl Evert from Plaintiff. When Earl Evert died on or about May 31, 2008, Mr. Paskell had an obligation to notify both the DC and Plaintiff of this material issue. However, though Mr. Paskell apparently notified the DC, he failed to provide any notice to Plaintiff. After Plaintiff learned of said defendant’s death in or around November, 2008, through an independent source, Plaintiff sought record of whether there was an estate through both Mr. Paskell and Ms. Allison, but both ignored his request. Plaintiff believes and thereon alleges that Earl Evert’s death was kept from Plaintiff to conceal the efforts of Earl Evert’s family in hiding his assets and to forego any claim Plaintiff would rightfully have had against the estate of Earl Evert, since had Plaintiff been able to make a timely request immediately following Earl Evert’s death, he could have had Earl Evert’s assets seized. Since Plaintiff did not learn of Earl Evert’s death until months later, his claim against the estate was blocked and the property fraudulently concealed by Earl Evert’s descendants must now be pursued through this cause of action.
     Still yet further, Ms. Allison tampered with records by removing motions filed by Plaintiff from the DC file. On or about May 15, 2008, Plaintiff filed two motions, one for judgment upon the pleadings against Earl Evert since he had not denied any material fact in his response, and a second to amend the identity of a Doe defendant to be identified as Wayne Evert, another of Earl Evert’s sons. Ms. Allison removed these motions from the DC file for over two months, from date of receipt on or about May 19, 2008, until on or about July 29, 2008 (see Docket for Cause No. DV 08-391, Lines 6.100 through 6.300, a true and correct copy attached hereafter as Exhibit B), and apparently communicated to Mr. Paskell that he would not be required to file responses thereto, since Mr. Paskell never filed responses to said motions.
     Not knowing of such duplicity, Plaintiff filed a motion for default rulings, which was filed and docketed for hearing only because Ms. Allison was out of town at a Clerk of Court Seminar. Upon initially receiving the motion on or about July 3, 2008, Judge Stadler refused to rule upon it and sent it back to the clerk’s office, which Plaintiff believes and thereon alleges was an effort to hide this motion, as well, but was prevented because the clerk’s office could not delete entries already made into the DC docket. Needing to resolve said issue, Ms. Allison entered the original motions on or about July 29, 2008 ( a full forty-seven days after receipt of the motion for default rulings upon said motions) and Judge Stadler summarily ruled upon them on or about August 1, 2008.
     However, Judge Stadler’s order defied all pretense of jurisprudence as he altered the motion to amend to be a motion to file an amended complaint (which would have effectively removed Plaintiff’s default claim against Ray Evert and any claim against Earl Evert who had died (unbeknownst to Plaintiff at the time), since Plaintiff could not re-serve a deceased party and no estate had been opened for Earl Evert), denied the motion for judgment on the pleadings through omitting critical language in the response, and thereafter denied the motion for default rulings upon the grounds that the motions had already been ruled upon! These rulings were blatantly in contrast to due process, as Plaintiff was clearly entitled to default relief when no response was filed to his motions. Instead, Judge Stadler interceded to defend the defendants of the cause in spite of the motions being uncontested! Further, the order in question was not even docketed until Plaintiff filed for supervisory control two weeks later!
     When it became clear that Plaintiff could not possibly receive a fair nor impartial administration of justice in Flathead County, he again sought supervisory control over the DC through two separate actions and subsequent motions for reconsideration within each (Cause Nos. OP 08-400 and OP 08-___). Yet the Montana Supreme Court again refused to intercede, even when faced with documented evidence of criminal misconduct by DC officials.
     As it presently stands, Plaintiff cannot proceed in his cause against the defendants because the DC has blatantly obstructed his constitutional rights of due process and access to the courts. Plaintiff cannot act to serve Ms. [*] nor Mr. Harris because Ms. Allison refuses to even issue summonses; he cannot get the DC to issue a default judgment against Ray Evert in spite of said defendant’s never having made an appearance in the cause; he has been denied default rulings to which he was entitled against Earl and Wayne Evert; and his efforts for relief submitted to the Montana Supreme Court have been brazenly denied.
    As such, the interests of justice cannot be served by this cause remaining under state jurisdiction and Plaintiff is left with no choice but to seek to have this cause removed to this Court’s jurisdiction so that Plaintiff can seek a fair and impartial administration of justice.


     The United States District Courts have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States (28 USCS Section 1343(3)). Further, any cause of action may be removed to this Court’s jurisdiction for any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of the State a right under any law providing for the equal rights of any citizen of the United States (28 USCS Section 1443(1)). The United States Constitution provides for due process, access to the courts and freedom to pursue grievances against government without molestation (Fifth and First Amendments), as well as to equal rights under the law (Fourteenth Amendment). In the instant case, these fundamental civil rights have been deprived to Plaintiff, and this Court has the authority to safeguard Plaintiff’s civil liberties by removing this cause to its jurisdiction.<
     Further, this Court has the authority to prevent and restrain violations of the federal R.I.C.O. Act (18 USCS Section 1961, et seq) by issuing appropriate orders, including but not limited to ordering any person to divest interest in any enterprise, impose reasonable restrictions upon such person, or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any such enterprise (18 USCS Section 1964(a)). To qualify for relief under the R.I.C.O. Act, it must be demonstrated that (1) Conduct of (2) an enterprise (3) through a pattern of (4) racketeering activity (5) causes injury to a person’s business or property (See Grimmett v. Brown, 75 F3d 506, 510 (9th Cir, 1996)). In the instant case, (1)felonious acts in defiance of the United States Constitution have been committed (2) by the DC and DC officials acting in chain conspiracy (3) through repeated predicate acts of obstruction of justice (in violation of 18 USCS Section 1503) and witness tampering and retaliation (in violation of 18 USCS Sections 1512 and 1513) (4) in support of corrupt government misconduct that has (5) caused significant damage to Plaintiff, his property and his businesses.
     The notion that R.I.C.O. applies only to organized crimes in the classic “mobster” sense has long been rejected (See United States v. Grande, 620 F2d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir, 1980)). The offices of public officials can be considered R.I.C.O. enterprises (United States v. McDade, 827 Fsupp 1153, 1181 (E.D.Pa., 1993)) and a government entity may constitute an enterprise within the meaning of R.I.C.O. (United States v. Freeman, 6 F3d 586 (9th Cir, 1993). Further, R.I.C.O. enterprises may include courts (United States v. Angelilli, 660 F2d 23 (2nd Cir, 1981); United States v. Bacheler, 611 F2d 443 (3rd Cir, 1979)). Even a city can be considered a R.I.C.O. enterprise (United States v. Labue, 751 Fsupp 748, 755 (N.D. Ill, 1990)).
     A R.I.C.O. predicate act requires only that a related threat is continuing or ongoing (see Corley v. Rosewood Care Center, Inc. or Peoria, 142 F3d 1041 (7th Cir, 1998)). Concealing documents is a violation of the obstruction of justice statute (United States v. Laurins, 857 F2d 529, 537 (9th Cir, 1988)) and constitutes a predicate act. Further, a clerk of court lacks the authority to refuse or strike a pleading presented for filing (McClellan v. Lone Star Gas Co., 66 F3d 98, 102 (5th Cir, 1995)). Additionally, Judicial remarks or actions during course of a legal proceeding that display deep-seated favoritism or antagonism toward a party makes fair judgment impossible (See Liteky v. United States, 114 SCt. 1147, 1157 (1994)).
     Fraud on the court is fraud directed to the judicial machinery itself (See Robinson v. Audi Aktiengesellschaft, 56 F3d 1259, 1266 (10th Cir, 1995)). It is this fraud where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced in such a way that a judge or other official cannot act in their official function, thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted (Ibid). Fraud on the court must involve officers of the court to subvert judicial machinery (Weese v. Schukman, 98 F3d 542, 552-53 (10th Cir, 1996); Sun-Tek Industries v. Kennedy Sky-Lites, 779 Fsupp 589, 593 (M.D. Fla., 1991)).
     The Petition Clause of the First Amendment protects people’s rights to make their wishes and interests known to government representatives free of molestation (Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noeir Motor Freight, Inc., 81 SCt 523 (1961)). Also, a cause of action is property (See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 102 SCt 1148, 1154, notes 4 and 5 (1982)).      As this conflict has been ongoing for nearly six years and the actions of the DC constitute conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity which has caused damage to Plaintiff’s business, reputation and property, this is a specific violation of the R.I.C.O. Act and Plaintiff believes he is entitled to intervention by this Court. The individual predicate acts have been constant and injurious, and the fraud perpetuated upon the DC by its own officers has rendered the capacity of that judicial system incapable of administering justice where Plaintiff’s interests are concerned. Consequently, since Plaintiff cannot realistically receive due process of law nor equal protection under the law while under the DC’s jurisdiction, the interests of justice are best served by removing Plaintiff from the DC’s influence.

     WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests of the Court to remove Cause No. DV 08-391 from the jurisdiction of the Eleventh Judicial District Court to this Court’s jurisdiction, and to grant whatever other relief as this Court deems appropriate.

     Plaintiff does hereby attest, under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct to the bets of his ability to present and that this is respectfully submitted on the ____ day of April, 2009.


Ron Glick, Plaintiff

No comments:

Post a Comment